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Abstract
Deep reinforcement learning has achieved many
recent successes, but our understanding of its
strengths and limitations is hampered by the lack
of rich environments in which we can fully char-
acterize optimal behavior, and correspondingly
diagnose individual actions against such a charac-
terization. Here we consider a family of combi-
natorial games, arising from work of Erdos, Sel-
fridge, and Spencer, and we propose their use
as environments for evaluating and comparing
different approaches to reinforcement learning.
These games have a number of appealing fea-
tures: they are challenging for current learning
approaches, but they form (i) a low-dimensional,
simply parametrized environment where (ii) there
is a linear closed form solution for optimal be-
havior from any state, and (iii) the difficulty of
the game can be tuned by changing environment
parameters in an interpretable way. We use these
Erdos-Selfridge-Spencer games not only to com-
pare different algorithms, but test for generaliza-
tion, make comparisons to supervised learning,
analyze multiagent play, and even develop a self
play algorithm.
1. Introduction
Deep reinforcement learning has seen many remarkable suc-
cesses over the past few years (Mnih et al., 2015; Silver
et al., 2017). But developing learning algorithms that are
robust across tasks and policy representations remains a
challenge (Henderson et al., 2017). Standard benchmarks
like MuJoCo and Atari provide rich settings for experimenta-
tion, but the specifics of the underlying environments differ
from each other in multiple ways, and hence determining
the principles underlying any particular form of sub-optimal
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behavior is difficult. Optimal behavior in these environ-
ments is generally complex and not fully characterized, so
algorithmic success is generally associated with high scores,
typically on a copy of the training environment making
it hard to analyze where errors are occurring or evaluate
generalization.
An ideal setting for studying the strengths and limitations
of reinforcement learning algorithms would be (i) a sim-
ply parametrized family of environments where (ii) optimal
behavior can be completely characterized and (iii) the envi-
ronment is rich enough to support interaction and multiagent
play.
To produce such a family of environments, we look in a
novel direction – to a set of two-player combinatorial games
with their roots in work of Erdos and Selfridge (Erdos &
Selfridge, 1973), and placed on a general footing by Spencer
(1994). Roughly speaking, these Erdos-Selfridge-Spencer
(ESS) games are games in which two players take turns
selecting objects from some combinatorial structure, with
the feature that optimal strategies can be defined by poten-
tial functions derived from conditional expectations over
random future play.
These ESS games thus provide an opportunity to capture the
general desiderata noted above, with a clean characterization
of optimal behavior and a set of instances that range from
easy to very hard as we sweep over a simple set of tunable
parameters. We focus in particular on one of the best-known
games in this genre, Spencer’s attacker-defender game (also
known as the “tenure game”; Spencer, 1994), in which —
roughly speaking — an attacker advances a set of pieces
up the levels of a board, while a defender destroys subsets
of these pieces to try prevent any of them from reaching
the final level (Figure 1). An instance of the game can be
parametrized by two key quantities. The first is the number
of levelsK, which determines both the size of the state space
and the approximate length of the game; the latter is directly
related to the sparsity of win/loss signals as rewards. The
second quantity is a potential function φ, whose magnitude
characterizes whether the instance favors the defender or
attacker, and how much “margin of error” there is in optimal
play.
The environment therefore allows us to study learning by
the defender and attacker, separately or concurrently in mul-
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tiagent and self-play. In the process, we are able to develop
insights about the robustness of solutions to changes in
the environment. These types of analyses have been long-
standing goals, but they have generally been approached
much more abstractly, given the difficulty in characterizing
step-by-step optimality in non-trivial environments such as
this one. Because we have a move-by-move characteriza-
tion of optimal play, we can go beyond simple measures of
reward based purely on win/loss outcomes and use super-
vised learning techniques to pinpoint the exact location of
the errors in a trajectory of play.
The main contributions of this work are thus the following:
1. We develop these combinatorial games as environ-
ments for studying the behavior of reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms in a setting where it is possible to charac-
terize optimal play and to tune the underlying difficulty
using natural parameters.
2. We show how reinforcement learning algorithms in
this domain are able to learn generalizable policies in
addition to simply achieving high performance, and
through new combinatorial results about the domain,
we are able to develop strong methods for multiagent
play that enhance generalization.
3. Through an extension of our combinatorial results, we
show how this domain lends itself to a subtle self-play
algorithm, which achieves a significant improvement
in performance.
4. We can characterize optimal play at a move-by-move
level and thus compare the performance of a deep RL
agent to one trained using supervised learning on move-
by-move decisions. By doing so, we discover an in-
triguing phenomenon: while the supervised learning
agent is more accurate on individual move decisions
than the RL agent, the RL agent is better at playing
the game! We further interpret this result by defining
a notion of fatal mistakes, and showing that while the
deep RL agent makes more mistakes overall, it makes
fewer fatal mistakes.
In summary, we present learning and generalization experi-
ments for a variety of commonly used model architectures
and learning algorithms. We show that despite the super-
ficially simple structure of the game, it provides both sig-
nificant challenges for standard reinforcement learning ap-
proaches and a number of tools for precisely understanding
those challenges.
Figure 1. One turn in an ESS Attacker-Defender game. The at-
tacker proposes a partition A,B of the current game state, and
the defender chooses one set to destroy (in this case A). Pieces in
the remaining set (B) then move up a level to form the next game
state.
2. Erdos-Selfridge-Spencer Attacker
Defender Game
We first introduce the family of Attacker-Defender Games
(Spencer, 1994), a set of games with two properties that
yield a particularly attractive testbed for deep reinforcement
learning: the ability to continuously vary the difficulty of the
environment through two parameters, and the existence of a
closed form solution that is expressible as a linear model.
An Attacker-Defender game involves two players: an at-
tacker who moves pieces, and a defender who destroys
pieces. An instance of the game has a set of levels num-
bered from 0 to K, and N pieces that are initialized across
these levels. The attacker’s goal is to get at least one of their
pieces to level K, and the defender’s goal is to destroy all
N pieces before this can happen. In each turn, the attacker
proposes a partition A,B of the pieces still in play. The
defender then chooses one of the sets to destroy and remove
from play. All pieces in the other set are moved up a level.
The game ends when either one or more pieces reach level
K, or when all pieces are destroyed. Figure 1 shows one
turn of play.
With this setup, varying the number of levels K or the
number of pieces N changes the difficulty for the attacker
and the defender. One of the most striking aspects of the
Attacker-Defender game is that it is possible to make this
trade-off precise, and en route to doing so, also identify a
linear optimal policy.
We start with a simple special case — rather than initial-
izing the board with pieces placed arbitrarily, we require
the pieces to all start at level 0. In this special case, we can
directly think of the game’s difficulty in terms of the number
of levels K and the number of pieces N .
Theorem 1. Consider an instance of the Attacker-Defender
game withK levels andN pieces, with allN pieces starting
at level 0. Then if N < 2K , the defender can always win.
There is a simple proof of this fact: the defender simply
always destroys the larger one of the sets A or B. In this
way, the number of pieces is reduced by at least a factor of
two in each step; since a piece must travel K steps in order
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to reach level K, and N < 2K , no piece will reach level K.
When we move to the more general case in which the board
is initialized at the start of the game with pieces placed at
arbitrary levels, it will be less immediately clear how to
define the “larger” one of the sets A or B. We therefore
describe a second proof of Theorem 1 that will be useful
in these more general settings. This second proof, due
to Spencer (1994), uses Erdos’s probabilistic method and
proceeds as follows.
For any attacker strategy, assume the defender plays ran-
domly. Let T be a random variable for the number of
pieces that reach level K. Then T =
∑
Ti where Ti
is the indicator that piece i reaches level K. But then
E [T ] =
∑
E [Ti] =
∑
i 2
−K : as the defender is play-
ing randomly, any piece has probability 1/2 of advancing a
level and 1/2 of being destroyed. As all the pieces start at
level 0, they must advance K levels to reach the top, which
happens with probability 2−K . But now, by choice of N ,
we have that
∑
i 2
−K = N2−K < 1. Since T is an integer
random variable, E [T ] < 1 implies that the distribution
of T has nonzero mass at 0 - in other words there is some
set of choices for the defender that guarantees destroying
all pieces. This means that the attacker does not have a
strategy that wins with probability 1 against random play
by the defender; since the game has the property that one
player or the other must be able to force a win, it follows
that the defender can force a win. This completes the proof.
Now consider the general form of the game, in which the
initial configuration can have pieces at arbitrary levels. Thus,
at any point in time, the state of the game can be described
by a K-dimensional vector S = (n0, n1, ..., nK), with ni
the number of pieces at level i.
Extending the argument used in the second proof above, we
note that a piece at level l has a 2−(K−l) chance of survival
under random play. This motivates the following potential
function on states:
Definition 1. Potential Function: Given a game state
S = (n0, n1, ..., nK), we define the potential of the state as
φ(S) =
∑K
i=0 ni2
−(K−i).
Note that this is a linear function on the input state, express-
ible as φ(S) = wT · S for w a vector with wl = 2−(K−l).
We can now state the following generalization of Theorem
1, again due to Spencer (1994).
Theorem 2 ((Spencer, 1994)). Consider an instance of the
Attacker-Defender game that has K levels and N pieces,
with pieces placed anywhere on the board, and let the initial
state be S0. Then
(a) If φ(S0) < 1, the defender can always win
(b) If φ(S0) ≥ 1, the attacker can always win.
One way to prove part (a) of this theorem is by directly ex-
tending the proof of Theorem 1, with E [T ] =
∑
E [Ti] =∑
i 2
−(K−li) where li is the level of piece i. After not-
ing that
∑
i 2
−(K−li) = φ(S0) < 1 by our definition of
the potential function and choice of S0, we finish off as in
Theorem 1.
This definition of the potential function gives a natural, con-
crete strategy for the defender: the defender simply destroys
whichever of A or B has higher potential. We claim that
if φ(S0) < 1, then this strategy guarantees that any subse-
quent state S will also have φ(S) < 1. Indeed, suppose
(renaming the sets if necessary) that A has a potential at
least as high asB’s, and thatA is the set destroyed by the de-
fender. Since φ(B) ≤ φ(A) and φ(A)+φ(B) = φ(S) < 1,
the next state has potential 2φ(B) (double the potential of
B as all pieces move up a level) which is also less than 1.
In order to win, the attacker would need to place a piece on
level K, which would produce a set of potential at least 1.
Since all sets under the defender’s strategy have potential
strictly less than 1, it follows that no piece ever reaches level
K.
For φ(S0) ≥ 1, Spencer (1994) proves part (b) of the theo-
rem by defining an optimal strategy for the attacker, using a
greedy algorithm to pick two sets A,B each with potential
≥ 0.5. For our purposes, the proof from Spencer (1994) re-
sults in an intractably large action space for the attacker; we
therefore (in Theorem 3 later in the paper) define a new kind
of attacker — the prefix-attacker — and we prove its opti-
mality. These new combinatorial insights about the game
enable us to later perform multiagent play, and subsequently
self-play.
3. Related Work
The Atari benchmark (Mnih et al., 2015) is a well known
set of tasks, ranging from easy to solve (Breakout, Pong) to
very difficult (Montezuma’s Revenge). Duan et al. (2016)
proposed a set of continuous environments, implemented
in the MuJoCo simulator (Todorov et al., 2012). An ad-
vantage of physics based environments is that they can be
varied continuously by changing physics parameters (Ra-
jeswaran et al., 2016), or by randomizing rendering (Tobin
et al., 2017). DeepMind Lab (Beattie et al., 2016) is a
set of 3D navigation based environments. OpenAI Gym
(Brockman et al., 2016) contains both the Atari and Mu-
JoCo benchmarks, as well as classic control environments
like Cartpole (Stephenson, 1909) and algorithmic tasks like
copying an input sequence. The difficulty of algorithmic
tasks can be easily increased by increasing the length of
the input. Automated game playing in algorithmic settings
has also been explored outside of RL (Bouzy & Métivier,
2010; Zinkevich et al., 2011; Bowling et al., 2017; Littman,
1994). Our proposed benchmark merges properties of both
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Figure 2. Training a linear network to play as the defender agent
with PPO, A2C and DQN. A linear model is theoretically expres-
sive enough to learn the optimal policy for the defender agent. In
practice, we see that for many difficulty settings and algorithms,
RL struggles to learn the optimal policy and performs more poorly
than when using deeper models (compare to Figure 3). An excep-
tion to this is DQN which performs relatively well on all difficulty
settings.
the algorithmic tasks and physics-based tasks, letting us in-
crease difficulty by discrete changes in length or continuous
changes in potential.
4. Deep Reinforcement Learning on the
Attacker-Defender Game
From Section 2, we see that the Attacker-Defender games
are a family of environments with a difficulty knob that can
be continuously adjusted through the start state potential
φ(S0) and the number of levels K. In this section, we de-
scribe a set of baseline results on Attacker-Defender games
that motivate the exploration in the remainder of this paper.
We set up the Attacker-Defender environment as follows:
the game state is represented by a K+ 1 dimensional vector
for levels 0 to K, with coordinate l representing the number
of pieces at level l. For the defender agent, the input is the
concatenation of the partition A,B, giving a 2(K + 1) di-
mensional vector. The start state S0 is initialized randomly
from a distribution over start states of a certain potential.
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Figure 3. Training defender agent with PPO, A2C and DQN for
varying values of potentials and two different choices of K with
a deep network. Overall, we see significant improvements over
using a linear model. DQN performs the most stably, while A2C
tends to fare worse than both PPO and DQN.
4.1. Training a Defender Agent on Varying
Environment Difficulties
We first look at training a defender agent against an at-
tacker that randomly chooses between (mostly) playing
optimally, and (occasionally) playing suboptimally for ex-
ploration (with the Disjoint Support Strategy, described in
the Appendix.) Recall from the specification of the po-
tential function, in Definition 1 and Theorem 2, that the
defender has a linear optimal policy: given an input par-
tition A,B, the defender simply computes φ(A) − φ(B),
with φ(A) =
∑K
i=0 aiwi, where ai is the number of pieces
in A at level i; φ(B) =
∑K
i=0 biwi, where bi is the number
of pieces inB at level i; and wi = 2−(K−i) is the weighting
defining the potential function.
When training the defender agent with RL, we have two
choices of difficulty parameters. The potential of the start
state, φ(S0), changes how close to optimality the defender
has to play, with values close to 1 giving much less lee-
way for mistakes in valuing the two sets. Changing K, the
number of levels, directly affects the sparsity of the reward,
with higher K resulting in longer games and less feedback.
Additionally, K also greatly increases the number of pos-
sible states and game trajectories (see Theorem 4 in the
Appendix).
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4.1.1. EVALUATING DEEP RL
As the optimal policy can be expressed as a linear network,
we first try training a linear model for the defender agent.
We evaluate Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) (Schul-
man et al., 2017), Advantage Actor Critic (A2C) (Mnih
et al., 2016), and Deep Q-Networks (DQN) (Mnih et al.,
2015), using the OpenAI Baselines implementations (Hesse
et al., 2017). Both PPO and A2C find it challenging to
learn the harder difficulty settings of the game, and perform
better with deeper networks (Figure 2). DQN performs
surprisingly well, but we see some improvement in perfor-
mance variance with a deeper model. In summary, while the
policy can theoretically be expressed with a linear model,
empirically we see gains in performance and a reduction in
variance when using deeper networks (c.f. Figures 3, 4.)
Having evaluated the performance of linear models, we
turn to using deeper neural networks for our policy net. (A
discussion of the hyperparameters used is provided in the
appendix.) Identically to above, we evaluate PPO, A2C
and DQN on varying start state potentials and K. Each
algorithm is run with 3 random seeds, and in all plots we
show minimum, mean, and maximum performance. Results
are shown in Figures 3, 4. Note that all algorithms show
variation in performance across different settings of poten-
tials and K, and show noticeable drops in performance with
harder difficulty settings. When varying potential in Figure
3, both PPO and A2C show larger variation than DQN. A2C
shows the greatest variation and worst performance out of
all three methods.
5. Generalization in RL and Multiagent
Learning
In the previous section we trained defender agents using
popular RL algorithms, and then evaluated the performance
of the trained agents on the environment. However, noting
that the Attacker-Defender game has a known optimal policy
that works perfectly in any game setting, we can evaluate
our RL algorithms on generalization, not just performance.
We take a setting of parameters, start state potential 0.95
and K = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 where we have seen the RL agent
perform well, and change the procedural attacker policy
between train and test. In detail, we train RL agents for
the defender against an attacker playing optimally, and test
these agents for the defender on the disjoint support attacker.
The results are shown in Figure 5 where we can see that
while performance is high, the RL agents fail to generalize
against an opponent that is theoretically easier. This leads
to the natural question of how we might achieve stronger
generalization in our environment.
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Figure 4. Training defender agent with PPO, A2C and DQN for
varying values of K and two different choices of potential (left
and right column) with a deep network. All three algorithms
show a noticeable variation in performance over different difficulty
settings. Again, we notice that DQN performs the best, with PPO
doing reasonably for lower potential, but not for higher potentials.
A2C tends to fare worse than both PPO and DQN.
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Figure 5. Plot showing overfitting to opponent strategies. A de-
fender agent is trained on the optimal attacker, and then tested on
(a) another optimal attacker environment (b) the disjoint support at-
tacker environment. The left pane shows the resulting performance
drop when switching to testing on the same opponent strategy as
in training to a different opponent strategy. The right pane shows
the result of testing on an optimal attacker vs a disjoint support
attacker during training. We see that performance on the disjoint
support attacker converges to a significantly lower level than the
optimal attacker.
Can Deep Reinforcement Learning Solve Erdos-Selfridge-Spencer Games?
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Training steps
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Av
er
ag
e 
Re
wa
rd
Attacker trained with PPO in multiagent setting 
 varying K, potential=1.1
K=5
K=10
K=15
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Training steps
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Av
er
ag
e 
Re
wa
rd
Attacker trained with PPO in multiagent setting 
 varying potential, K=10
potential=0.99
potential=1.05
potential=1.1
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Training steps
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Av
er
ag
e 
Re
wa
rd
Defender trained with PPO in multiagent setting 
 varying K, potential=0.99
K=5
K=15
K=30
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Training steps
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Av
er
ag
e 
Re
wa
rd
Defender trained with PPO in multiagent setting 
 varying potential, K=10
pot=0.95
pot=0.99
pot=1.0
pot=1.03
pot=1.05
pot=1.1
Figure 6. Performance of attacker and defender agents when learn-
ing in a multiagent setting. In the top panes, solid lines denote
attacker performance. In the bottom panes, solid lines are defender
performance. The sharp changes in performance correspond to the
times we switch which agent is training. We note that the defender
performs much better in the multiagent setting. Furthermore, the
attacker loses to the defender for potential 1.1 at K = 15, despite
winning against the optimal defender in Figure 11 in the Appendix.
We also see (right panes) that the attacker has higher variance and
sharper changes in its performance even under conditions when it
is guaranteed to win.
5.1. Training an Attacker Agent
One way to mitigate this overfitting issue is to set up a
method of also training the attacker, so that we can train the
defender against a learned attacker, or in a multiagent setting.
However, determining the correct setup to train the attacker
agent first requires devising a tractable parametrization of
the action space. A naive implementation of the attacker
would be to have the policy output how many pieces should
be allocated to A for each of the K + 1 levels (as in the
construction from Spencer (1994)). This can grow very
rapidly in K, which is clearly impractical. To address this,
we first prove a new theorem that enables us to parametrize
an optimal attacker with a much smaller action space.
Theorem 3. For any Attacker-Defender game withK levels,
start state S0 and φ(S0) ≥ 1, there exists a partition A,B
such that φ(A) ≥ 0.5, φ(B) ≥ 0.5, and for some l, A
contains pieces of level i > l, and B contains all pieces of
level i < l.
Proof. For each l ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K}, let Al be the set of all
pieces from levels K down to and excluding level l, with
AK = ∅. We have φ(Ai+1) ≤ φ(Ai), φ(AK) = 0 and
φ(A0) = φ(S0) ≥ 1. Thus, there exists an l such that
φ(Al) < 0.5 and φ(Al−1) ≥ 0.5. If φ(Al−1) = 0.5, we set
Al−1 = A and B the complement, and are done. So assume
φ(Al) < 0.5 and φ(Al−1) > 0.5
Since Al−1 only contains pieces from levels K to l, po-
tentials φ(Al) and φ(Al−1) are both integer multiples of
2−(K−l), the value of a piece in level l. Letting φ(Al) =
n · 2−(K−l) and φ(Al−1) = m · 2−(K−l), we are guaran-
teed that level l has m − n pieces, and that we can move
k < m− n pieces from Al−1 to Al such that the potential
of the new set equals 0.5.
This theorem gives a different way of constructing and
parametrizing an optimal attacker. The attacker outputs
a level l. The environment assigns all pieces before level l
to A, all pieces after level l to B, and splits level l among A
and B to keep the potentials of A and B as close as possible.
Theorem 3 guarantees the optimal policy is representable,
and the action space is linear instead of exponential in K.
With this setup, we train an attacker agent against the opti-
mal defender with PPO, A2C, and DQN. The DQN results
were very poor, and so we show results for just PPO and
A2C. In both algorithms we found there was a large varia-
tion in performance when changing K, which now affects
both reward sparsity and action space size. We observe less
outright performance variability with changes in potential
for small K but see an increase in the variance (Figure 11
in Appendix).
5.2. Learning through Multiagent Play
With this attacker training, we can now look at learning in a
multiagent setting. We first explore the effects of varying the
potential and K as shown in Figure 6. Overall, we find that
the attacker fares worse in multiagent play than in the single
agent setting. In particular, note that in the top left pane
of Figure 6, we see that the attacker loses to the defender
even with φ(S0) = 1.1 for K = 15. We can compare this
to Figure 11 in the Appendix where with PPO, we see that
with K = 15, and potential 1.1, the single agent attacker
succeeds in winning against the optimal defender.
5.3. Single Agent and Multiagent Generalization
Across Opponent Strategies
Finally, we return again to our defender agent, and test
generalization between the single and multiagent settings.
We train a defender agent in the single agent setting against
the optimal attacker, and test on a an attacker that only
uses the Disjoint Support strategy. We also test a defender
trained in the multiagent setting (which has never seen any
hardcoded strategy of this form) on the Disjoint Support
attacker. The results are shown in Figure 7. We find that the
defender trained as part of a multiagent setting generalizes
noticeably better than the single agent defender. We show
the results over 8 random seeds and plot the mean (solid
line) and shade in the standard deviation.
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Figure 7. Results for generalizing to different attacker strategies
with single agent defender and multiagent defender. The figure
single agent defender trained on the optimal attacker and then
tested on the disjoint support attacker and a multiagent defender
also tested on the disjoint support attacker for different values ofK.
We see that multiagent defender generalizes better to this unseen
strategy than the single agent defender.
6. Training with Self Play
In the previous section, we showed that with a new theo-
retical insight into a more efficient attacker action space
paramterization (Theorem 3), it is possible to train an at-
tacker agent. The attacker agent was parametrized by a
neural network different from the one implementing the
defender, and it was trained in a multiagent fashion. In
this section, we present additional theoretical insights that
enables training by self-play: using a single neural network
to parametrize both the attacker and defender.
The key insight is the following: both the defender’s optimal
strategy and the construction of the optimal attacker in The-
orem 3 depend on a primitive operation that takes a partition
of the pieces into sets A,B and determines which of A or
B is “larger” (in the sense that it has higher potential). For
the defender, this leads directly to a strategy that destroys
the set of higher potential. For the attacker, this primitive
can be used in a binary search procedure to find the desired
partition in Theorem 3: given an initial partition A,B into
a prefix and a suffix of the pieces sorted by level, we deter-
mine which set has higher potential, and then recursively
find a more balanced split point inside the larger of the two
sets. This process is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Thus, by training a single neural network designed to im-
plement this primitive operation — determining which of
two sets has higher potential — we can simultaneously train
both an attacker and a defender that invoke this neural net-
work. We use DQN for this purpose because we found
empirically that it is the quickest among our alternatives at
Algorithm 1 Self Play with Binary Search
initialize game
repeat
Partition game pieces at center into A,B
repeat
Input partition A,B into neural network
Output of neural network determines next binary
search split
Create new partition A,B from this split
until Binary Search Converges
Input final partition A,B to network
Destroy larger set according to network output
until Game Over: use reward to update network parame-
ters with RL algorithm
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Figure 8. We train an attacker and defender via self play using a
DQN. The defender is implemented as in Figures 4, 3, and the same
neural network is used to train an attacker agent, performing binary
search according to the Q values on partitions of the input space
A,B. We then test the defender agent on the same procedural
attacker used in Figures 4, 3, and find that self play shows markedly
improved performance.
converging to consistent estimates of relative potentials on
sets. We train both agents in this way, and test the defender
agent on the same attacker used in Figures 2, 3 and 4. The
results in Figure 8 show that a defender trained through self
play significantly outperforms defenders trained against a
procedural attacker.
7. Supervised Learning vs RL
Aside from testing the generalization of RL, the Attacker-
Defender game also enables us to make a comparison with
Supervised Learning. The closed-form optimal policy en-
ables an evaluation of the ground truth on a per move basis.
We can thus compare RL to a Supervised Learning setup,
where we classify the correct action on a large set of sam-
pled states. To carry out this test in practice, we first train
a defender policy with reinforcement learning, saving all
observations seen to a dataset. We then train a supervised
network (with the same architecture as the defender policy)
on this dataset to classify the optimal action. We then test
the supervised network to determine how well it can play.
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Figure 9. Plots comparing the performance of Supervised Learning
and RL on the Attacker Defender Game for different choices of K.
The left pane shows the proportion of moves correct for supervised
learning and RL (according to the ground truth). Unsurprisingly,
we see that supervised learning is better on average at getting the
ground truth correct move. However, RL is better at playing the
game: a policy trained through RL significantly outperforms a
policy trained through supervised learning (right pane), with the
difference growing for larger K.
We find an interesting dichotomy between the proportion
of correct moves and the average reward. Unsurprisingly,
supervised learning boasts a higher proportion of correct
moves: if we keep count of the ground truth correct move
for each turn in the game, RL has a lower proportion of
correct moves compared to supervised learning (Figure 9
left pane). However, in the right pane of Figure 9, we
see that RL is better at playing the game, achieving higher
average reward for all difficulty settings, and significantly
beating supervised learning as K grows.
This contrast forms an interesting counterpart to recent find-
ings of (Silver et al., 2017), who in the context of Go also
compared reinforcement learning to supervised approaches.
A key distinction is that their supervised work was relative
to a heuristic objective, whereas in our domain we are able
to compare to provably optimal play. This both makes it
possible to rigorously define the notion of a mistake, and
also to perform more fine-grained analysis as we do in the
remainder of this section.
Specifically, how is it that the RL agent is achieving higher
reward in the game, if it is making more mistakes at a
per-move level? To gain further insight into this, we cat-
egorize the per-move mistakes into different types, and
study them separately. In particular, suppose the defender
is presented with a partition of the pieces into two sets,
where as before we assume without loss of generality that
φ(A) ≥ φ(B). We say that the defender makes a terminal
mistake if φ(A) ≥ 0.5 while φ(B) < 0.5, but the defender
chooses to destroyB. Note that this means the defender now
faces a forced loss against optimal play, whereas it could
have forced a win with optimal play had it destroyed A. We
also define a subset of the family of terminal mistakes as
follows: we say that the defender makes a fatal mistake
if φ(A) + φ(B) < 1, but φ(A) ≥ 0.5 and the defender
chooses to destroy B. Note that a fatal mistake is one that
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Figure 10. Figure showing the frequencies of different kinds of
mistakes made by supervised learning and RL that would cost the
game. The left pane shows the frequencies of fatal mistakes: where
the agent goes from a winning state (potential< 1) to a losing state
(potential ≥ 1). A superset of this kind of mistake, terminal mis-
takes, look at where the agent makes the wrong choice (irrespective
of state potential), destroying (wlog) set A with φ(A) < 0.5, in-
stead of B, with φ(B) ≥ 0.5. In both cases we see that RL makes
significantly fewer mistakes than supervised learning, particularly
as difficulty increases.
converts a position where the defender had a forced win to
one where it has a forced loss.
In Figure 10, we see that especially as K gets larger, re-
inforcement learning makes terminal and fatal mistakes
at a much lower rate than supervised learning does. This
suggests a basis for the different in performance: even if
supervised learning is making fewer mistakes overall, it is
making more mistakes in certain well-defined consequential
situations.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed Erdos-Selfridge-Spencer
games as rich environments for investigating reinforcement
learning, exhibiting continuously tunable difficulty and an
exact combinatorial characterization of optimal behavior.
We have demonstrated that algorithms can exhibit wide vari-
ation in performance as we tune the game’s difficulty, and
we use the characterization of optimal behavior to evaluate
generalization over raw performance. We provide theoreti-
cal insights that enable multiagent play and, through binary
search, self play. Finally, we compare RL and Supervised
Learning, highlighting interesting tradeoffs between per
move optimality, average reward and fatal mistakes. We
also develop further results in the Appendix, including an
analysis of catastrophic forgetting, generalization across
different values of the game’s parameters, and a method
for investigating measures of the model’s confidence. We
believe that this family of combinatorial games can be used
as a rich environment for gaining further insights into deep
reinforcement learning.
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Appendix
Additional Definition and Results from
Section 4
Note that for evaluating the defender RL agent, we initially
use a slightly suboptimal attacker, which randomizes over
playing optimally and with a disjoint support strategy. The
disjoint support strategy is a suboptimal verison (for better
exploration) of the prefix attacker described in Theorem
3. Instead of finding the partition that results in sets A,B
as equal as possible, the disjoint support attacker greedily
picksA,B so that there is a potential difference between the
two sets, with the fraction of total potential for the smaller
set being uniformly sampled from [0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4] at each
turn. This exposes the defender agent to sets of uneven
potential, and helps it develop a more generalizable strategy.
To train our defender agent, we use a fully connected deep
neural network with 2 hidden layers of width 300 to rep-
resent our policy. We decided on these hyperparameters
after some experimentation with different depths and widths,
where we found that network width did not have a signifi-
cant effect on performance, but, as seen in Section 4, slightly
deeper models (1 or 2 hidden layers) performed noticeably
better than shallow networks.
Additional Results from Section 5
Here in Figure 11 we show results of training the attacker
agent using the alternative parametrization given with Theo-
rem 3 with PPO and A2C (DQN results were very poor and
have been omitted.)
Other Generalization Phenomena
Generalizing Over Different Potentials and K
In the main text we examined how our RL defender agent
performance varies as we change the difficulty settings of
the game, either the potential or K. Returning again to the
fact that the Attacker-Defender game has an expressible
optimal that generalizes across all difficulty settings, we
might wonder how training on one difficulty setting and
testing on a different setting perform. Testing on different
potentials in this way is straightforwards, but testing on
different K requires a slight reformulation. our input size
to the defender neural network policy is 2(K + 1), and so
naively changing to a different number of levels will not
work. Furthermore, training on a smaller K and testing on
larger K is not a fair test – the model cannot be expected to
learn how to weight the lower levels. However, testing the
converse (training on larger K and testing on smaller K)
is both easily implementable and offers a legitimate test of
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Figure 11. Performance of PPO and A2C on training the attacker
agent for different difficulty settings. DQN performance was very
poor (reward < −0.8 at K = 5 with best hyperparams). We see
much greater variation of performance with changing K, which
now affects the sparseness of the reward as well as the size of the
action space. There is less variation with potential, but we see a
very high performance variance with lower (harder) potentials.
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Figure 12. On the left we train on different potentials and test on
potential 0.99. We find that training on harder games leads to
better performance, with the agent trained on the easiest potential
generalizing worst and the agent trained on a harder potential
generalizing best. This result is consistent across different choices
of test potentials. The right pane shows the effect of training on
a larger K and testing on smaller K. We see that performance
appears to be inversely proportional to the difference between the
train K and test K.
generalization. We find (a subset of plots shown in Figure
12) that when varying potential, training on harder games
results in better generalization. When testing on a smaller
K than the one used in training, performance is inverse to
the difference between train K and test K.
Catastrophic Forgetting and Curriculum Learning
Recently, several papers have identified the issue of catas-
trophic forgetting in Deep Reinforcement Learning, where
switching between different tasks results in destructive inter-
ference and lower performance instead of positive transfer.
We witness effects of this form in the Attacker-Defender
games. As in Section 8, our two environments differ in the
K that we use – we first try training on a small K, and then
train on larger K. For lower difficulty (potential) settings,
we see that this curriculum learning improves play, but for
higher potential settings, the learning interferes catastrophi-
cally, Figure 13
Understanding Model Failures
Value of the Null Set
The significant performance drop we see in Figure 5 moti-
vates investigating whether there are simple rules of thumb
that the model has successfully learned. Perhaps the sim-
plest rule of thumb is learning the value of the null set: if
one of A,B (say A) consists of only zeros and the other (B)
has some pieces, the defender agent should reliably choose
to destroy B. Surprisingly, even this simple rule of thumb is
violated, and even more frequently for larger K, Figure 14.
Model Confidence
We can also test to see if the model outputs are well cali-
brated to the potential values: is the model more confident
in cases where there is a large discrepancy between poten-
tial values, and fifty-fifty where the potential is evenly split?
The results are shown in Figure 15.
8.1. Generalizing across Start States and Opponent
Strategies
In the main paper, we mixed between different start state dis-
tributions to ensure a wide variety of states seen. This begets
the natural question of how well we can generalize across
start state distribution if we train on purely one distribution.
The results in Figure 16 show that training naively on an
‘easy’ start state distribution (one where most of the states
seen are very similar to one another) results in a significant
performance drop when switching distribution.
In fact, the amount of possible starting states for a given K
and potential φ(S0) = 1 grows super exponentially in the
number of levels K. We can state the following theorem:
Theorem 4. The number of states with potential 1 for a
game with K levels grows like 2Θ(K
2) (where 0.25K2 ≤
Θ(K2) ≤ 0.5K2 )
We give a sketch proof.
Proof. Let such a state be denoted S. Then a trivial upper
bound can be computed by noting that each si can take
a value up to 2(K−i), and producting all of these together
gives roughly 2K/2.
For the lower bound, we assume for convenience that K is
a power of 2 (this assumption can be avoided). Then look
at the set of non-negative integer solutions of the system of
simultaneous equations
aj−121−j + aj2−j = 1/K
where j ranges over all even numbers between log(K) + 1
and K. The equations don’t share any variables, so the
solution set is just a product set, and the number of solutions
is just the product
∏
j(2
j−1/K) where, again,j ranges over
even numbers between log(K) + 1 and K. This product is
roughly 2K
2/4.
8.2. Comparison to Random Search
Inspired by the work of (Mania et al., 2018), we also include
the performance of random search in Figure ??
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Figure 13. Defender agent demonstrating catastrophic forgetting when trained on environment 1 with smaller K and environment 2 with
larger K.
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Out of the K + 1 possible one hot sets, we determine the
proportion that are not picked when paired with the null (zero) set,
and plot this value for different K.
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Figure 15. Confidence as a function of potential difference between
states. The top figure shows true potential differences and model
confidences; green dots are moves where the model prefers to make
the right prediction, while red moves are moves where it prefers to
make the wrong prediction. The right shows the same data, plotting
the absolute potential difference and absolute model confidence
in its preferred move. Remarkably, an increase in the potential
difference associated with an increase in model confidence over a
wide range, even when the model is wrong.
Can Deep Reinforcement Learning Solve Erdos-Selfridge-Spencer Games?
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Figure 16. Change in performance when testing on different state
distributions
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Figure 17. Performance of random search from (Mania et al.,
2018). The best performing RL algorithms do better.
